Beijing modestly increased the intensity of China Coast Guard (CCG) patrols in the exclusive economic zones of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. It also employed new and more frequent forms of grey zone violence, particularly against the Philippines. In the face of this pressure, Southeast Asian claimants made modest gains while Beijing failed in both its tactical and strategic aims.
Tensions between China and the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal posed a dangerous risk of escalation. The Philippines maintains a tenuous military base at the shoal via the grounded BRP Sierra Madre. The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration award ruled that the shoal is part of the Philippine exclusive economic zone, but China still claims it.
CCG and militia ships blockaded Philippine resupply missions to the Sierra Madre in 2023 and early 2024. This was an attempt to prevent the Philippines from delivering construction materials to repair the ship.
The CCG and militia presence around Second Thomas Shoal remained elevated in the first six months of 2024. They changed their tactics to more aggressively damage Philippine vessels, leading to multiple injuries to Filipino personnel and a growing anxiety that an accidental fatality might trigger US defence obligations under the US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.
This came to a head on 17 June 2024 when the Philippines was unable to complete a resupply mission due to CCG personnel ramming and boarding Philippine vessels while armed with knives and other weapons. A Filipino sailor had his thumb severed during the clash, and it took hours for China to allow his evacuation.
The tone of US–China and Philippines–China meetings shifted as Beijing seemed concerned that the incident came close to triggering US intervention due to the near death of a Filipino sailor.
The Philippines was willing to cut a deal to return to the status quo ante, having sufficiently repaired the Sierra Madre. Manila had achieved its tactical aim, while Beijing had not. At the next Bilateral Consultative Mechanism between Manila and Beijing, the two sides reached a provisional agreement — the Philippines would bring only necessary supplies to the Sierra Madre, and China would end the blockade. The deal has held, though violence and collisions continue at other sites, particularly Sabina and Scarborough Shoals.
Farther south, Indonesia and Malaysia faced an increased number of CCG vessels in their waters harassing oil and gas operations. A diplomatic letter leaked in September 2024 revealed China had pressured Malaysia to halt oil and gas exploration near Luconia Shoals. This was not mere rhetoric — for the first time, at least one CCG vessel patrolled Malaysian waters around Luconia Shoals every day of the year.
China also challenged a seismic survey in Indonesia’s Natuna D-Alpha gas field conducted by PT Pertamina. During a three-week standoff between CCG, Indonesian law enforcement and naval vessels in October 2024, Indonesia publicly released photos and footage of China’s harassment. Despite Chinese operations, Malaysia drilled 15 new exploratory wells off Sarawak in 2024 and Indonesia completed its survey operations — another tactical success by Southeast Asian claimants standing up to grey zone pressure.
China also failed to contain Vietnam’s operations — Vietnam undertook the most significant expansion of its outposts in a single year, focusing on Barque Canada Reef, now the fourth-largest outpost in the Spratly Islands. By mid-2024, Vietnam had created more than two-thirds as much land as China in the Spratlys and may match China’s acreage in 2025. Satellite imagery shows that while Vietnam is still building its second runway at Barque Canada Reef, Pearson Reef has been expanded to fit another runway.
While tensions and the risk of escalation reached a new high point in 2024, it is worth asking which claimants, if any, improved their positions. The Philippines repaired the Sierra Madre while barely avoiding a major escalation. It instrumentalised the violence it faced to persuade 27 countries, plus the European Union, to call for Beijing to comply with the 2016 arbitral award.
On the ground, the Philippines modernised its alliance with the United States, signed a major new Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan, and deepened defence ties with other partners, including Australia, Germany, France, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam. This is a major strategic setback for Beijing and is far more costly than its tactical failure to prevent repairs to the Sierra Madre.
Vietnam built out its islands and began constructing dual-use infrastructure without facing significant costs from Beijing. Indonesia successfully surveyed the Natuna D-Alpha field, while Malaysia developed more oil and gas projects in the South China Sea in 2024 than in any previous year.
In contrast, China controlled no more water or airspace on 31 December 2024 than on 1 January. It had not stopped a single major oil and gas project and was unable to attain its most public goal — preventing the Philippines from delivering construction materials to repair the Sierra Madre. It also pushed the Philippines deeper into the emerging alliance network that Beijing insists is contrary to its own strategic interests.
If China pursues the same tactics in 2025, it is likely to get the same results — no tactical gain, further deterioration of the regional strategic environment and an unacceptably high risk of accidental escalation.
Gregory Poling is Senior Fellow and Director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC.
Monica Michiko Sato is Research Associate of the Asia Maritime Security Initiative (AMTI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C.
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