China’s Grey-Zone Tactics Are Reshaping the South China Sea

Over the past two decades, Southeast Asia has faced a conflict that is no longer overt but has left behind a trail of escalating tensions.

Over the past two decades, Southeast Asia has faced a conflict that is no longer overt but has left behind a trail of escalating tensions. These tensions stem from actions that fall into a “gray zone,” carried out gradually and systematically. This strategy has been used by China as a key instrument in expanding its territorial claims without having to fire a single shot or wage war in the South China Sea. The grey zone has become one of the most decisive dynamics in shaping the new security landscape in the Indo-Pacific.

The Grey Zone is not just a strategy but a tool used by a country to build “advantages” without causing escalation that could trigger direct war. In the context of China, this strategy is useful for forcing other countries to slowly accept changes to the status quo. This approach is in line with the concept of coercive diplomacy, which asserts that limited pressure can force other parties to change their position without military confrontation. China understands that war is a very costly option from both an economic and military perspective. Therefore, the use of coast guards, maritime militias, and civilian survey ships is a far more effective alternative for achieving its strategic objectives. China’s two main instruments, the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), are the spearheads of operations below the threshold of war. Both are equipped with weapons such as large ships, modern radar, and even lasers or water cannons but remain under the narrative of “law enforcement.”

Since 2013, the presence of CCG and PAFMM ships around the Spratlys and Paracels has increased, especially after China accelerated the construction of artificial islands. This is part of a “salami slicing” pattern that narrows the space for other countries to maneuver through small but gradual steps. In some cases, these vessels have engaged in dangerous maneuvers against Philippine, Vietnamese, and Malaysian ships by blocking supply vessels, chasing fishing boats, and even directing laser beams at other vessels to disrupt their observations. These actions are designed to be aggressive enough to assert control but not so provocative as to trigger military intervention from the United States or other regional allies. From a coercive diplomacy perspective, China is pursuing a strategy of gradualism, applying steady pressure that forces smaller countries to reconsider whether resistance is worth the cost. The Philippines has experienced water cannon incidents many times, but each incident has only resulted in diplomatic protests rather than a change in the balance of power on the field.

One of the most prominent aspects of China’s strategy is its use of legal narratives. China frames almost every incident as a professional and legitimate action by its coast guard to protect its national territory. These narratives are not mere rhetoric but part of China’s three-pronged warfare strategy, which is public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.

In the South China Sea, the dispute over these small islands is not merely about territorial claims; rather, the region is of paramount strategic and economic importance because more than one-third of global maritime trade passes through it, making it a vital trade route. Control over this route could increase China’s economic and geopolitical leverage. Furthermore, the region is rich in natural resources such as oil and gas reserves, which will certainly help to fulfill China’s future energy needs. Furthermore, China is also seeking to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and position itself as a major maritime power, thereby reducing the role of the United States. These strategic needs are the reason why it will be very difficult for China to relax its grey zone approach, as this strategy is an instrument that can change the status quo without incurring too great a cost to its reputation.

 

Looking at the responses of ASEAN countries, their responses are not entirely the same even though they are all affected. The Philippines has been the most vocal, especially since the laser incident involving their patrol boat. Vietnam has also strengthened its navy, while Malaysia tends to remain silent but strengthen its closed diplomacy. In this case, China’s strategy works because the parties under pressure do not have the capacity to respond in a balanced manner. Most of these ASEAN countries cannot provide punishment deterrence, so they can only rely on denial deterrence, which strengthens their ability to defend themselves and reduces the effectiveness of China’s pressure. On the other hand, the United States is trying to provide security guarantees through “Freedom of Navigation” operations, but these are more responsive than preventive. The uncertainty of these small countries means that China does not want to miss this golden opportunity to expand its sphere of influence.

Then, legally and militarily, China’s Grey Zone strategy is difficult to counter. Simply, there is no involvement of weapons in this strategy, and the actions of the CCG and PAFMM are difficult to categorize as use of force under international law. Second, coast guards and maritime militias are not included in the armed forces, which means they operate in a legal gray area. Finally, if the attacking vessels are fishing boats that have undergone modification, it is difficult for the targeted country to prove that they are part of a state operation. Broadly speaking, the more ambiguous China’s actions are, the more room they have to change the maritime reality without triggering open conflict.

However, this strategy could inadvertently trigger a major conflict. This can be seen from the large Chinese coast guard ships that can easily ram other ships, causing casualties and triggering escalation. The Grey Zone only works as long as all parties can restrain themselves, but if one party is cornered and loses control, escalation could very likely occur within hours.

In this situation, China’s Grey Zone in the South China Sea poses a serious threat to regional stability. This strategy creates pressure without war but can significantly change the political and legal reality by exploiting legal loopholes, power imbalances, and narrative ambiguities. Countries in the region must build more effective security mechanisms that go beyond military buildup to include coast guard coordination mechanisms, maritime incident protocols, enhanced technological capabilities, and more aggressive international legal diplomacy.

This argument underscores that without innovation in defense approaches, the region will continue to be mired in uncertainty, and China’s Grey Zone strategy will become increasingly effective year after year. Ultimately, regional stability requires legal clarity, a balance of power, and the ability of countries to resist pressure that moves silently, rather than relying solely on the absence of war.

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China holds ‘bomber patrol’ over South China Sea to counter Philippines, US, Japan maritime drills

 The Chinese military for the first time conducted a “bomber formation patrol” with its fighter jets over the disputed South China Sea on Sunday as a “warning” to the Philippines after its navy conducted joint patrols with the US and Japan.

China, which claims most of the South China Sea, is locked in an intractable maritime dispute with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, which have counterclaims over the area that is home to busy regional and international trade routes.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theatre Command announced that it had conducted a bomber formation patrol amid the Philippines’ so-called “joint patrols” with external forces — the first time it has announced such a move, according to the state-run Global Times.

The two-day maritime exercise by the US, Japan and the Philippines ran from Friday to Saturday.

In a statement, a spokesperson for the Southern Theatre Command, Senior Colonel Tian Junli, said the Philippines has frequently colluded with external forces to carry out so-called “joint patrols,” undermining regional peace and stability.

“We solemnly warn the Philippine side to immediately stop provoking incidents and escalating tensions,” he said.

The theatre command forces maintain a high level of alert at all times, resolutely safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and peace and stability in the South China Sea region, Tian said.

Any attempt to infringe on the sovereignty and stir up trouble will never succeed, he added.

According to military affairs experts, the bomber formation is one of the PLA’s diversified strike methods.

Song Zhongping, a military affairs expert, told the Global Times that the bombers are among the most important air strike forces, and the dispatch of a bomber formation can demonstrate stronger strike capability. These can also carry out effective saturation attacks even if the opponent has large surface ships, he said.

The Philippines has been courting external forces to conduct so-called “joint patrols” in the South China Sea, posing threats to China’s sovereignty over its islands and reefs, he said.

Against this background, the PLA bomber formation’s patrol could serve as a warning to the provocateurs’ warships, Song added.

In recent months, tensions between the Philippines and China escalated with naval and coast guard ships of both countries colliding to assert control of the areas they claim.

China’s bomber patrols also came in the backdrop of a sudden spurt of tensions between China and Japan.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently said that any Taiwan emergency involving the use of military force by China could be recognised as a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan under its security legislation, which may allow it to exercise the right of collective self-defence.

Her remarks have stirred up a major diplomatic row between Tokyo and Beijing.

China warned that any Japanese intervention in Taiwan would be seen as an act of aggression and would be met with strong retaliation.

A commentary by the Chinese military mouthpiece, the PLA Daily, on Sunday warned that Japan risked turning its entire country into a battlefield if it intervened militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

In the strongly worded commentary, the official newspaper of the PLA said Takaichi had revealed Tokyo’s “wolfish ambition to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs through military means”.

The commentary warned that Japan’s “misguided actions” would only lead the country “down a path of no return”.

“It risks the entire country becoming a battlefield,” it said.

Meanwhile, reports from Tokyo said on Sunday that following Takaichi’s firm stand, her public approval rate rose to 69.9 per cent, up 5.5 percentage points from the previous poll conducted shortly after she took office late last month.

The survey, held over two days from Saturday, found that 60.4 per cent favoured an increase in defence spending to bolster Japan’s defence capabilities, while 48.8 per cent supported the exercise of its right to collective self-defence in the event of a Taiwan contingency, according to the Japanese news agency, Kyodo.

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Philippines Pushes to Seal South China Sea Code in 2025

The Philippines is gearing up for a pivotal year as it prepares to chair ASEAN in 2025, with Manila setting its sights on completing the long-delayed Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea.

The Philippines is gearing up for a pivotal year as it prepares to chair ASEAN in 2025, with Manila setting its sights on completing the long-delayed Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea. Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro said momentum is finally building after years of stalled talks, with “a sense among ASEAN and China” that the agreement can be concluded. The code, first pledged in 2002, took 15 years just to begin formal discussions, and negotiations since then have inched forward at a slow and often politically fraught pace.

Why It Matters

A legally binding COC could reshape one of the world’s most contested maritime regions, where fishing rights, energy reserves, and military influence collide. China’s expansive claims, enforced by coast guard and maritime militia vessels, frequently clash with the exclusive economic zones of ASEAN neighbours. For the Philippines backed more assertively by the United States in recent years codifying rules of engagement would not only strengthen regional security but also curb incidents that have repeatedly triggered diplomatic crises.

The potential breakthrough comes as tensions remain high, with Washington accusing Beijing of destabilising the region and Manila recording a surge in confrontations near its waters.

Regional Stakes

ASEAN’s internal dynamics also complicate the picture. While members broadly support completing the COC, they vary in how forcefully they challenge China. Lazaro’s simultaneous role as ASEAN’s special envoy for Myanmar adds another layer of responsibility, as she tries to revive dialogue between warring factions in a country where the 2021 coup plunged the nation into crisis.

Frustration within ASEAN has grown over Myanmar’s failure to implement the bloc’s five-step peace plan. With the junta planning elections in December dismissed by the UN and many analysts as lacking credibility ASEAN members insist that dialogue and de-escalation must come first.

What’s Next

The Philippines aims to leverage its ASEAN chairmanship to push the COC across the finish line, though the hurdles ahead remain significant. A legally binding agreement would require China to accept limits on activities that it has long defended as sovereign rights. Whether Beijing is willing to make such commitments remains uncertain.

Still, Manila believes the region’s appetite for stability and growing pressure from repeated clashes may finally open a window. As the Philippines prepares to lead ASEAN, the coming year could prove decisive for maritime diplomacy and for the bloc’s unity on broader regional conflicts, including Myanmar’s unresolved crisis.

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U.S. Statement on Dangerous Chinese Actions in the South China Sea

The United States condemns China’s October 12 ramming and water cannoning of a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessel close to Thitu Island in the South China Sea. We stand with our Philippine allies as they confront China’s dangerous actions which undermine regional stability. China’s sweeping territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea and its increasingly coercive actions to advance them at the expense of its neighbors continue to undermine regional stability and fly in the face of its prior commitments to resolve disputes peacefully.

The United States reaffirms Article IV of the 1951 United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea.

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Philippines says Chinese ship ‘deliberately rammed’ government boat in South China Sea

 Philippines says Chinese ship ‘deliberately rammed’ government boat in South China Sea

 

Beijing blames Manila for the collision, saying the ship ‘ignored repeated stern warnings from the Chinese side’

A Chinese ship “deliberately rammed” a Philippine government vessel anchored near an island in a disputed part of the South China Sea, Manila’s coast guard said on Sunday.

Confrontations between Philippine and Chinese vessels occur frequently in the South China Sea, which Beijing claims nearly in its entirety despite an international ruling that the claim has no legal basis.

The Philippines said a Chinese coast guard ship “fired its water cannon” at the BRP Datu Pagbuaya, a vessel belonging to Manila’s fisheries bureau, at 9.15am on Sunday.

“Just three minutes later … the same [Chinese] vessel deliberately rammed the stern” of the Philippine boat, “causing minor structural damage but no injuries to the crew”, the statement said.

“Despite these bullying tactics and aggressive actions … we will not be intimidated or driven away.”

Beijing blamed the Philippines for the collision. Liu Dejun, a Chinese coast guard spokesperson, said the Philippine ship “ignored repeated stern warnings from the Chinese side, and dangerously approached” the other ship.

Manila’s coast guard said the incident took place near Thitu Island, part of the Spratly island group where Beijing has sought to assert its sovereignty claims for years.

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Why is China setting up a nature reserve in one of the world’s most contested waterways?

China’s latest nature reserve is a rock in the middle of one of the world’s most contested waterways.

On Wednesday, the Chinese government approved a proposal to establish a national nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal, a hotly contested reef in the South China Sea, in an unprecedented move that has ignited a fresh war of words with rival claimant the Philippines.

The reserve will cover more than 3,500 hectares at Huangyan Island, the Chinese name for Scarborough Shoal, with its coral reef ecosystem as the main protection target, according to China’s National Forestry and Grassland Administration.

The move has drawn strong protest from the Philippines and marks a new step in China’s effort to reinforce its territorial claims in the South China Sea, a strategic, resource-rich waterway through which more than 60 percent of global maritime trade transits.

China claims almost the entire South China Sea, including features hundreds of miles from its mainland, despite a 2016 international ruling against its claim.

The Philippines will issue a formal diplomatic protest over the reserve, its foreign ministry said in a statement Thursday, calling China’s action “illegitimate and unlawful” and accusing it of infringing on Manila’s rights and interests.

It said the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the shoal, which it calls Bajo de Masinloc, describing it as a “longstanding and integral part” of the Philippines.

China’s foreign ministry hit back, saying it rejects the Philippines’ “groundless accusations and so-called protests” and urges it to stop its “provocations and hype.”

Located 200 km (124 miles) off the Philippines, the Scarborough Shoal lies within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and has long been a flashpoint between Beijing and Manila. The triangular chain of reefs and rocks is coveted for its strategic location, bountiful fish stocks, and role as a sanctuary for boats during storms.

China seized the uninhabited atoll – 870 km (540 miles) from its southernmost province of Hainan – in 2012 after a long standoff with the Philippine Navy, and has maintained an almost constant coast guard presence in nearby waters since. It has ramped up patrols in recent years, blocking Philippine fishermen from their traditional fishing grounds.

Tensions came to a head in August, when a Chinese navy destroyer dramatically collided with a China Coast Guard ship and badly damaged its bow while chasing a Philippine patrol vessel near Scarborough Shoal – a collision that highlighted the danger of the increasingly frequent and violent clashes between the two sides.

The Philippines is a mutual defense ally of the United States, meaning serious clashes between Beijing and Manila could quickly spiral into something that drags the US military into the fray.

In a statement, China’s cabinet, the State Council, called the establishment of the nature reserve “an important guarantee for maintaining the diversity, stability and sustainability of Huangyan Island’s natural ecosystem.” It also called for stronger enforcement against “illegal activities” at the reserve.

Chinese experts have hailed the move as an important step in defending China’s territorial sovereignty and signaled it could set a precedent for other maritime features in the South China Sea, according to state media reports.

A map released by the Chinese government shows the entire northeastern rim of the atoll designated as the reserve, which consists of a “core zone” flanked by two “experimental zones.”

Under Chinese law, a core zone is strictly off limits, while an experimental zone allows scientific research, educational activities as well as tourism. Construction is forbidden in core zones but allowed in experimental zones. Foreigners must obtain approval from Chinese authorities to enter any reserve.

Ding Duo, a researcher at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, told the state-run Global Times that the decision to establish a nature reserve is a “strong rebuttal” to accusations that China has damaged the marine environment of the South China Sea.

China’s narrative that it plans to protect fragile ecosystems in the South China Sea will likely raise eyebrows among neighbors and conservationists given Beijing’s years of island building across the disputed waters have caused significant environmental damage.

Philippine National Security Adviser Eduardo Año said China’s move is “less about protecting the environment and more about justifying its control” over the maritime feature.

“The irony is clear: since 2016, evidence has shown large-scale harvesting of endangered species and reef destruction by Chinese fishermen,” he said in a statement. “To now claim stewardship over an ecosystem that they themselves has damaged is both contradictory and misleading.”

A 2023 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said China had buried roughly 4,648 acres of reefs through dredging and land fill to build artificial islands. In addition, Chinese giant clam harvesting damaged an estimated 16,353 acres of coral reef, the report said.

Much of the Chinese construction centered on the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, and China has not built any facilities on Scarborough Shoal, according to CSIS.

The Philippines has also accused China’s shadowy maritime militia of destroying coral reefs in the South China Sea. China has rejected the accusation and accused the Philippines of damaging the coral reef ecosystem in the waterway instead.

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ASEAN at a Crossroads: Unity or Fragmentation in the South China Sea Dispute

ASEAN currently stands at a decisive crossroads. On one side, the region faces intensifying external pressure from great-power rivalry in the South China Sea. On the other, it remains burdened by unresolved internal problems: the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand, the humanitarian crisis of the Rohingya in Myanmar, and the maritime dispute over the Ambalat Block between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Reaching a common perception among ASEAN states on the South China Sea has become an urgent necessity to address external challenges and demonstrate the bloc’s capacity to resolve internal conflicts through dialogue and peaceful settlement.

External powers shaping ASEAN’s dynamics.

The South China Sea is a vital international trade artery worth over US$3 trillion annually, and equally rich in energy and natural resources. China’s sweeping “nine-dash line” claim, struck down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016, remains rejected by Beijing, fueling ongoing tensions. Since 2002, ASEAN and China have been negotiating a Code of Conduct (COC), yet progress has been painstakingly slow. Disagreements over scope and legal standing remain unresolved. Meanwhile, aggressive maneuvers at sea, such as “ramming” incidents and harassment of Philippine vessels by Chinese coast guard ships, have created tangible risks of escalation. In a recent development, a U.S. destroyer was forced out of the Scarborough Shoal area following a confrontation with Chinese patrols, underlining the volatile and layered tensions in these contested waters.

 

Competition for influence in Southeast Asia has also intensified with the entry of European actors, particularly France, which has sought to expand its strategic footprint by offering economic, technological, and defence benefits. Indonesia’s multi-billion-dollar purchase of French Rafale fighter jets illustrates this shift. For Jakarta, the deal is not only about modernising its military arsenal but also about broadening strategic partnerships and diversifying security support beyond the traditional poles of the United States and China. France’s presence highlights a new layer of geopolitical rivalry in ASEAN, where member states must carefully balance short-term benefits with long-term consistency in upholding collective principles.

Without a unified stance, ASEAN risks losing momentum in shaping the narrative and outcome of this dispute, as well as those to come.

 

The necessity of collaboration

A shared ASEAN perception would strengthen collective legitimacy in upholding UNCLOS and the arbitral ruling. By speaking with one voice, the bloc would enhance its moral and political leverage in pressing parties to respect international law. This cohesion is not only about legal principle but also about preventing dangerous miscalculations that could spiral into armed confrontation.

 

A significant moment in regional security cooperation occurred when the Philippines and India held their first-ever joint naval exercise in the South China Sea, signalling a collective effort to uphold maritime sovereignty and international law through security partnerships. Similarly, Exercise “Alon 25” involving Australia, the United States, Canada, and the Philippines, took place near Scarborough Shoal, symbolising collective deterrence against unilateral aggression.

 

The Ambalat dispute: a framework for diplomatic cooperation

In the broader context of peaceful resolution, the dispute over the Ambalat block between Indonesia and Malaysia offers a valuable lesson. While both nations lay claim to the resource-rich territory, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim have openly committed to resolving differences through dialogue and peaceful means. This bilateral understanding demonstrates that when there is political will at the highest level, potential disputes can be contained without sacrificing bilateral ties. Nations, particularly in the ASEAN region, should look to Ambalat as a concrete precedent that a peaceful resolution is both possible and practical. Such a framework could be used in Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis and the Cambodia–Thailand border tensions, or the broader South China Sea issue. Nevertheless, the challenges to consensus remain formidable. National interests vary widely. The Philippines and Vietnam are taking a more assertive stance against China, while Malaysia has opted for pragmatism to preserve its economic ties. The absence of a shared spirit has often been evident in ASEAN’s reluctance to issue strong collective statements at international forums. Meanwhile, Philippine officials have stressed that Beijing must address the “trust deficit” caused by its aggressive actions at sea while also warning that diplomacy alone is insufficient without credible deterrence measures.

 

The path forward

Moving forward, ASEAN must take several critical steps. First, it should formulate a binding consensus that commits all members to international law, including the recognition of UNCLOS, the renunciation of force, and strong support for accelerating the COC negotiations. Second, ASEAN needs to institutionalise platforms for discussing not only the South China Sea but also other pressing issues—such as Myanmar, Ambalat, and the Cambodia–Thailand border—so that peaceful resolution becomes a norm, not an exception. Finally, the bloc must strengthen transparency and crisis management mechanisms, such as coast guard dialogues or hotlines, to reduce the risk of miscalculation.

ASEAN’s relevance in the eyes of the world depends on its ability to speak with one voice. The South China Sea is the stage upon which this credibility will be tested. Suppose ASEAN can transcend its internal differences and unify around the principles of international law. In that case, it will enhance its bargaining power with both Beijing and Washington, while preserving the integrity of the regional order. Success in forging a common stance on the South China Sea will create momentum for resolving Ambalat peacefully, reviving dialogue on Myanmar, and providing a model for Cambodia and Thailand. Failure, however, risks further fragmentation, diminished global credibility, and an ASEAN that drifts toward irrelevance. The choice before the bloc is stark yet simple: unify perceptions, or succumb to fragility.

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China Plays South China Sea-Style “Salami Slicing” Tricks In The Yellow Sea; What’s Cooking In Indo-Pacific?

After aggressive posturing in the South China Sea, China is upping the ante in the Yellow Sea, following the building of a gigantic steel rig.

This has been a bone of contention between South Korea and China. The Coast Guards of the two countries recently had a standoff after Korean ships wanted to investigate the steel structure.

South Korean news agency Yonhap quoted diplomatic sources as saying that the two coast guards had engaged in a two-hour-long standoff. The confrontation took place on the afternoon of February 26 in the Provisional Maritime Zone (PMZ) near Socotra Rock, southwest of South Korea’s Jeju Island.

The PMZ is a jointly managed stretch of the Yellow Sea, also known in Korea as the West Sea, where the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of China and South Korea overlap.

In an uncanny similarity to its strategy against the Philippines Coast Guard, the Chinese coast guard vessels and civilian boats blocked the South Korean research ship Onnuri, which was there at the behest of the South Korean government to conduct a survey of the structure.

According to South Korean media, in response, Seoul dispatched a coast guard vessel to the scene, resulting in a two-hour standoff. South Korea contended its inspection was legitimate, whereas the Chinese side claimed that the structure was an aquafarm and asked the Korean vessel to leave.

South Korea had reportedly summoned an official from the Chinese Embassy in Seoul to lodge a protest over the incident.

Latest satellite images indicate that China has installed several large steel platforms in the PMZ. The PMZ was established under a 2000 agreement, which allows fishing and navigation in the disputed region until the maritime boundary issue is resolved.

This differs from the EEZ, which extends 200 nautical miles from the coast and grants the claimant country exclusive rights to access its underwater resources and fishing grounds, as per international maritime law.

Shen Lan 2 Hao (or Deep Blue 2) is a 71.5-meter-tall underwater marine cage deployed by China into the PMZ for salmon aquaculture. The massive cage and the jack-up support rig sparked concern in South Korea. The Korean government asserts its right to inspect the structure under the 2001 Korea-China Fisheries Agreement.

South Korea alleges that the structure was placed without prior notification or consent. On earlier occasions, China had installed platforms in the region, only to have them removed following protests from Seoul. However, the latest installation, featuring three long legs that can be lowered to the sea floor for stability, signals China’s beefing up of its presence in the region.

Move To Grab Territory?

The overlapping areas of EEZs between China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea are believed to be rich in natural resources, including oil. In pursuance of cementing its claims, China has been installing artificial structures.

Ray Powell, the Director of SeaLight and Project Lead for Project Myoushu at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, examined the images from Planet Labs. According to him, the rig measures approximately 108 meters long (from helipad to its opposite tower) and 82 meters broad.

Based on SeaLight’s analysis, “this rig was first deployed in October 2022. The new rig replaced a smaller rig that was sent out at least two years before to join Shen Lan 2 Hao’s own smaller predecessor, Shen Lan 1 Hao, which was first deployed in 2018 to much fanfare.”

Sealight analysis sheds light on the impasse in the East China Sea. The Qingdao-based China Coast Guard (CCG) 6402, along with the patrolling CCG 6305 and three civilian-crewed rubber boats, blocked the path of the Korean research vessel. Chinese civilians aboard the rubber boats were reportedly armed with knives and shouted demands to leave.

China claims Shen Lan 2 Hao heralds a new era in sustainable aquaculture. It is operated by the state-backed Shandong Marine Group and features automated feeding systems, underwater imaging, and remote-control capabilities, enabling salmon farming in 9,000 cubic meters of caged water. Disregarding the 2001 agreement, Beijing claims the structure is located within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

However, the Socotra Rock, known as Ieodo in South Korea and Suyan Islet in China, where the standoff took place, is a submerged rock formation that falls within the overlapping EEZ claims between the two countries. In fact, in 2003, when South Korea set up the Ieodo Ocean Research Centre, Beijing described the move as “unilateral” and “illegal.”

According to Powell, “A more cynical view is that this is an early step in bringing a South China Sea-style gray zone campaign of ‘salami slicing’ to the Yellow Sea. In this view, the incremental deployment of rigs of increasing size into the PMZ reflects a recognizable pattern of testing rival states’ resolve with ostensibly civilian and coast guard presence while avoiding overt militarization.”

The former USAF veteran, Powell, contends that China’s civil-military fusion keeps the door open for non-salmon harvesting activities, such as intelligence collection, close to its giant support rig. There is no difference between the Chinese Navy, Coast Guard, and militia. It is all under the aegis of national maritime security. They just have different roles. It is a ‘might be the right’ kind of setup. That is why like-minded countries are coming together to establish a rule-based order.

China’s distant-water fishing fleet has been suspected of intelligence gathering and is the vanguard of China’s “Gray Zone Tactics.”

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Philippines, China accuse each other of dangerous moves in disputed South China Sea shoal

China and the Philippines accused each other on Tuesday of dangerous manoeuvres in a hotly disputed shoal in the South China Sea, in the latest confrontation over the waterway.

A Chinese coast guard vessel sped up and manoeuvred on Monday to block the navigation route of a Philippine vessel around 36 nautical miles off the Scarborough shoal, the Philippine Coast Guard said.

"This incident highlights the CCG's non-compliance with the international regulations ... and reflects a blatant disregard for safety at sea," it said.

China's coast guard said the Philippine vessel "dangerously approached" its ship and crossed its route, alleging it attempted to stage a false collision, Xinhua reported on Tuesday.

"They illegally approached China’s normal sailing coast guard ship in a dangerous manner, threatening the safety of China’s personnel and ships," Xinhua reported.

Tensions between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea have escalated in the last two years, including in the Scarborough Shoal, a prime fishing patch claimed by both as their territory.

China claims nearly the entire South China Sea, a vital waterway for more than $3 trillion of annual ship-borne commerce, parts of which are also claimed by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

The Philippine Coast Guard deployed a plane on Tuesday to challenge a Chinese research vessel which it said was operating without authority in its northern waters near Taiwan.

Chinese research vessel Zhong Shan Da Xue was spotted around 78 nautical miles off the northern island province of Batanes, and did not respond to attempts by the Philippine Coast Guard's Islander aircraft to establish radio communication.

"PCG aviators underscored on their radio challenge that the said Chinese vessel lacks the authority to conduct marine scientific research within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines," the coast guard said.

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South Korea Installs Platform to Monitor Chinese Presence in Disputed Sea

 

South Korea has set up a “reciprocal” platform in a disputed area of the Yellow Sea, known in Seoul as the West Sea, where China has increasingly built structures, Oceans Minister Kang Do-hyung said on Wednesday.

China says its structures are fish farming equipment, but they have raised alarm bells in Seoul over concerns Beijing could be seeking to stake claims in the Provisional Maritime Zone, where the two countries’ exclusive economic zones overlap.

Kang told parliament that South Korea is monitoring the Chinese presence by setting up a stationary floating platform for “environmental survey.”

“South Korea has taken reciprocal measure with a large-scale floating object,” he said.

In February, a South Korean research vessel sent to examine the Chinese structures was blocked by Chinese coast guard ships and rubber boats carrying civilians, according to South Korean media reports.

The South Korean coast guard also deployed and was involved in a two-hour stand-off before retreating, the reports said.

Lawmakers from South Korea’s ruling People Power Party on Tuesday called the Chinese presence a “direct challenge to marine security” and urged a more forceful response.

Kwon Young-se, chairman of the party’s emergency response committee, said China was using fishing as a pretext and compared its actions to those it has taken in the South China Sea, where Beijing claims vast swathes of the area, despite overlapping claims by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

“The West Sea is not just a sea, the West Sea is Korea,” he said. “It is where many fishermen make their living, and the front line of our security.”

In a statement on Wednesday, a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Seoul said some reports about the structures were not factual and that they do not violate any agreements.

“The fact is that the relevant facilities set up by China are deep-sea fishery aquaculture facilities located in China’s coastal waters, which are China’s reasonable use of offshore marine resources,” the spokesperson said in a statement.

China maintains communication through diplomatic channels, and hopes to “avoid unwarranted politicization of the matter,” the spokesperson added. “China and South Korea have maintained good and smooth communication on their differences related to the sea.”

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G7 ministers condemn China's 'coercive' actions in South China Sea

 

Foreign ministers of the G7 nations have condemned China's actions that have posed risks to regional stability, while expressing concern over efforts to restrict freedom of navigation and overflight through "force" and "coercion" in the South China Sea.

This was conveyed on Friday in the Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity by G7 foreign ministers following their meeting in La Malbaie, Canada this week.

"We condemn China's illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose," the declaration read.

It added, "We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas."

The ministers highlighted the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight, which have been  areas of concern for the Philippines amid its territorial dispute with China.

Aside from past incidents of water cannon attacks in the West Philippine Sea, tensions between the two countries have also reached the skies. One such incident happened last February, when a Chinese helicopter flew as close as three meters above and on the side of an aircraft of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) over Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal.

"We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law," the ministers said.

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Vietnam Registers Tonkin Gulf Maritime Boundaries with UN Under UNCLOS

 Vietnam Registers Tonkin Gulf Maritime Boundaries with UN Under UNCLOS

 UN Confirms Vietnam's Submission of Nautical Chart and Baseline Coordinates

The United Nations has officially acknowledged Vietnam's registration of its nautical chart and baseline coordinates for the Tonkin Gulf, further strengthening the country's maritime boundaries under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Vietnam's Baseline Registration at the UN

In a notification dated March 12 to UN member states, the Secretary-General confirmed that on March 7, the Government of Vietnam submitted its nautical chart and a list of geographic coordinates outlining straight baselines for its mainland territory in the Tonkin Gulf. This submission, made in accordance with Article 16(2) of UNCLOS, also defines the outer limits of Vietnam’s territorial sea in the region.

The UN website officially published Vietnam’s baseline submission details on March 14, further solidifying its legal standing under international maritime law.

Additionally, the notification highlighted that Vietnam’s official declaration on February 21, 2025, regarding the baseline used to determine the breadth of its territorial sea in the Tonkin Gulf, will be included in an upcoming edition of the UN’s "Law of the Sea Bulletin."

Vietnam’s move to register its baselines is a significant step in affirming its maritime sovereignty and ensuring compliance with UNCLOS regulations. This development is expected to contribute to regional stability and enhance legal clarity in the Tonkin Gulf.

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Beijing Treads Water in the South China Sea

2024 brought increased tensions between China and Southeast Asian nations over South China Sea disputes. China continued down the same dangerous but ultimately ineffective path it has walked since 2022, failing to make and consolidate gains in the region.

Beijing modestly increased the intensity of China Coast Guard (CCG) patrols in the exclusive economic zones of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. It also employed new and more frequent forms of grey zone violence, particularly against the Philippines. In the face of this pressure, Southeast Asian claimants made modest gains while Beijing failed in both its tactical and strategic aims.

Tensions between China and the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal posed a dangerous risk of escalation. The Philippines maintains a tenuous military base at the shoal via the grounded BRP Sierra Madre. The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration award ruled that the shoal is part of the Philippine exclusive economic zone, but China still claims it.

CCG and militia ships blockaded Philippine resupply missions to the Sierra Madre in 2023 and early 2024. This was an attempt to prevent the Philippines from delivering construction materials to repair the ship.

The CCG and militia presence around Second Thomas Shoal remained elevated in the first six months of 2024. They changed their tactics to more aggressively damage Philippine vessels, leading to multiple injuries to Filipino personnel and a growing anxiety that an accidental fatality might trigger US defence obligations under the US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.

This came to a head on 17 June 2024 when the Philippines was unable to complete a resupply mission due to CCG personnel ramming and boarding Philippine vessels while armed with knives and other weapons. A Filipino sailor had his thumb severed during the clash, and it took hours for China to allow his evacuation.

The tone of US–China and Philippines–China meetings shifted as Beijing seemed concerned that the incident came close to triggering US intervention due to the near death of a Filipino sailor.

The Philippines was willing to cut a deal to return to the status quo ante, having sufficiently repaired the Sierra Madre. Manila had achieved its tactical aim, while Beijing had not. At the next Bilateral Consultative Mechanism between Manila and Beijing, the two sides reached a provisional agreement — the Philippines would bring only necessary supplies to the Sierra Madre, and China would end the blockade. The deal has held, though violence and collisions continue at other sites, particularly Sabina and Scarborough Shoals.

Farther south, Indonesia and Malaysia faced an increased number of CCG vessels in their waters harassing oil and gas operations. A diplomatic letter leaked in September 2024 revealed China had pressured Malaysia to halt oil and gas exploration near Luconia Shoals. This was not mere rhetoric — for the first time, at least one CCG vessel patrolled Malaysian waters around Luconia Shoals every day of the year.

China also challenged a seismic survey in Indonesia’s Natuna D-Alpha gas field conducted by PT Pertamina. During a three-week standoff between CCG, Indonesian law enforcement and naval vessels in October 2024, Indonesia publicly released photos and footage of China’s harassment. Despite Chinese operations, Malaysia drilled 15 new exploratory wells off Sarawak in 2024 and Indonesia completed its survey operations — another tactical success by Southeast Asian claimants standing up to grey zone pressure.

China also failed to contain Vietnam’s operations — Vietnam undertook the most significant expansion of its outposts in a single year, focusing on Barque Canada Reef, now the fourth-largest outpost in the Spratly Islands. By mid-2024, Vietnam had created more than two-thirds as much land as China in the Spratlys and may match China’s acreage in 2025. Satellite imagery shows that while Vietnam is still building its second runway at Barque Canada Reef, Pearson Reef has been expanded to fit another runway.

While tensions and the risk of escalation reached a new high point in 2024, it is worth asking which claimants, if any, improved their positions. The Philippines repaired the Sierra Madre while barely avoiding a major escalation. It instrumentalised the violence it faced to persuade 27 countries, plus the European Union, to call for Beijing to comply with the 2016 arbitral award.

On the ground, the Philippines modernised its alliance with the United States, signed a major new Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan, and deepened defence ties with other partners, including Australia, Germany, France, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam. This is a major strategic setback for Beijing and is far more costly than its tactical failure to prevent repairs to the Sierra Madre.

Vietnam built out its islands and began constructing dual-use infrastructure without facing significant costs from Beijing. Indonesia successfully surveyed the Natuna D-Alpha field, while Malaysia developed more oil and gas projects in the South China Sea in 2024 than in any previous year.

In contrast, China controlled no more water or airspace on 31 December 2024 than on 1 January. It had not stopped a single major oil and gas project and was unable to attain its most public goal — preventing the Philippines from delivering construction materials to repair the Sierra Madre. It also pushed the Philippines deeper into the emerging alliance network that Beijing insists is contrary to its own strategic interests.

If China pursues the same tactics in 2025, it is likely to get the same results — no tactical gain, further deterioration of the regional strategic environment and an unacceptably high risk of accidental escalation.

Gregory Poling is Senior Fellow and Director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC.

Monica Michiko Sato is Research Associate of the Asia Maritime Security Initiative (AMTI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C.

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